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INTRODUCTION 
Building indigenous armies in less developed countries with 
military advisory and aid programs has been an ongoing 
responsibility of the United States Army in this century. 
Often operating in primitive locales, many advisory programs 
were underfunded, short staffed and only succeeded because 
of dedicated American advisors. My thesis analyzes the 
impact that one man, Captain James H. Hausman, United States 
Army, had on the South Korean Army between July 1946 and 
August 1948. 
Establishment of a South Korean Army was an early goal of 
American occupation policy in Korea. However, little support 
was given and few resources assigned. Between 1946 and 1948, 
a minute American advisory effort partially trained and 
equipped a South Korean Army cadre of 25,000 men. 
The unceasing efforts of a talented American advisor, Captain 
James Hausman, made success possible. Assigned as a military 
advisor to Korea in July 1946, Captain Hausman had during the 
next 2 years overwhelming influence in altering Korean 
military affairs. He throughly analyzed the many problems 
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facing the South Korean Army and worked diligently to solve 
them. Overcoming cultural differences and shortages of 
everything, Captain Hausman provided continuity to the 
American advisory effort during the lean years of 1946 to mid 
1948. He personified the positive attributes of the American 
military advising to South Korea. His efforts to improve the 
South Korean Army were capped by his successful reform of the 
civilian -military command structure of the South Korean Army 
in June 1948. 
Although Captain Hausman served nearly five years in Korea, 
his first tour of duty, 1946-1948, was the most significant. 
He dominated the small advisory group and was given carte 
blanche to implement his ideas. He left indelible changes on 
the South Korean Army and defense structure. 
Captain Hausman's overwhelming influence declined with South 
Korean independence in August 1948. No longer was he the 
"father -creator" of the South Korean Army, solely responsible 
for an overwhelming portion of the advisory effort. Instead 
he became a member of a better funded and much larger staffed 
American military advisory effort. As the advisory effort 
expanded, his role changed. Recognizing his abilities and 
experience, General William L. Roberts chose him for the 
delicate position of liaison officer between the American 
advisors and the Korean Army Chief of Staff. Although 
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certainly important, this position lacked the overwhelming 
power Captain Hausman had previously possessed. He served in 
this position with distinction until February 1951 when he 
returned to the United States. 
Many historians see Captain Hausman's impact during the years 
1946 to 1948 as enlightened and positive. Gregory Henderson 
later wrote in his work on Korea, 
No American officer had, at that time (1946), 
any concept of the complex background of the men 
and groups (Koreans) with which he was dealing. 
Except for a devoted young officer named 
James Hausman, few stayed to find out 1/ 
1/ Gregory Henderson, Korea: Politics of a Vortex, 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 340 
CHAPTER I. - ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KOREAN CONSTABULARY 
SEPTEMBER 1945 TO JULY 1946 
KOREA AND U.S. ARMY OCCUPATION TO NOVEMBER 1945 
Japanese hegemony was established in north Asia after the 
collapse of Tsarist Russian power during the Russo-Japanese 
War of 1904. Lacking diplomatic support from the Great 
Powers, Korea could not resist Japanese encroachments on its 
independence and by 1910, Korea was a satellite of Japan. 
Repression and control of all aspects of life were tenets of 
Japanese rule for the next 35 years. Any public 
demonstration of Korean nationalism was squelched. The 
Japanese ruthlessly exploited their Korean colony. Much of 
Korea's rice was exported to Japan, and Korean industry was 
restructured toward heavy goods production for the Japanese 
military economy. This created unbalanced Korean industrial 
production incapable of meeting domestic needs. 
The institutions of Japanese political and economic control 
developed during 35 years of occupation collapsed suddenly 
with Japanese defeat in August 1945. As Japanese power 
dissolved, chaos filled the vacuum. A legacy of the Japanese 
was the lack of native trained administrators. No Koreans 
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1/ Map copied from: Korea 1950 (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of the Army, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1982), p. inside cover. 
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had held significant managerial posts in industry, the 
occupation government, the police, or the military. 
The rapid Japanese collapse left the United States (U.S.) 
with inadequate plans for the administration of Korea. The 
Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.) entry into the Pacific War 
accelerated planning on the joint American -Russian occupation 
of the Korean peninsula. Since the U.S. wanted the capital 
city and a large port in its occupation zone, it proposed a 
temporary division of occupation responsibilities at the 38th 
Parallel, the U.S. occupying the southern zone, the U.S.S.R 
the northern zone. American planning envisioned eventual 
reunification of the zones when the postwar situation was 
more settled. Democratic elections would be held and a 
Korea, favorable to the U.S., would emerge. But no timetable 
for Korean independence existed. 
Unfortunately for Koreans, both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were 
determined to foster a Korea favorable to their interests. 
The occupation powers represented two distinct political and 
economic systems in conflict. This confrontation inevitably 
led to the division of the peninsula at the 38th Parallel. 
The futile negotiations of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission 
on Korea during the first half of 1946 made it obvious that 
the occupation powers were unable to agree on a policy to 
reunify the zones. 
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The occupying powers administered their zones differently. 
Early on, the Russians restricted in their zone any Korean 
political or military activity contrary to their interests. 
Failing to wrestle control of the entire peninsula away from 
the Americans through negotiations, they embarked on creating 
a client state in their zone by mid -1946. For the Americans, 
occupation was an unwanted burden. Inheriting a situation 
where political and economic chaos reined, the U.S. wanted to 
establish a friendly democratic Korea but lacked a policy to 
achieve it. The occupying powers were unable to agree on how 
to reunify Korea and on what consituted a democratic 
government. The U.S. groped for a policy to deal with Korea. 
To Americans, the occupation of Korea was considered a 
backwater assignment, a sideshow to the more important events 
in Japan. American prestige was tied to success in Japan, 
not Korea. A long-term American commitment was not 
originally intended for Korea. The American occupation 
command in the South was divided into two parts: the U.S. 
Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) concerned with 
civilian affairs; and the Army occupation force, called U.S. 
Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK). The army of occupation was 
composed of the XXIV Corps and commanded by Lt. General 
John R. Hodge, who was the senior American officer in Korea 
between September 1945 and August 1948. to another. The 
occupation command was critically short of military 
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government teams, translators and civilian administrators. 
Heeding the domestic and troop cries for rapid 
demobilization, USAFIK and USAMGIK was debilitated by the 
pell mell departure of veteran troops. Reinforcement of 
USAFIK was not a high priority. 
TOWARD A KOREAN NATIONAL DEFENSE FORCE 
An early action taken during the American occupation was the 
reconstitution of a Korean police agency. About 30 percent 
of this force were Korean police who had held minor posts 
under the Japanese. The police were to maintain internal 
order and relieve USAFIK forces from this duty. 1/ 
Nevertheless, violent internal disorders, common in postwar 
Korea, were more than the Korean police could handle and 
American troops were constantly used to help keep internal 
order. The USAFIK was a ready police reserve and provided 
for Korean national defense. The American command realized 
that as demobilization stripped away troops, establishment 
of a USAMGIK government bureau to manage Korean national 
defense and police reserve forces was necessary. 2/ 
1/ Interview of Colonel Reamer W. Argo by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 21 November 1951, Records of the Army Staff, Office 
of the Chief of Military History, Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 
Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War, Record 
Group 319, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Box 728. 
2/ Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Peace and War: 
KMAG in Peace and War, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
(footnote continued on page 9) 
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INITIAL PLANS FOR A KOREAN DEFENSE FORCE 
On 10 November 1945, USAFIK Headquarters appointed an officer 
board to determine the needs of a Korean national defense 
program. 1/ On 13 November this officer board was merged 
into the newly established USAMGIK's Bureau of National 
Defense (BND). The bureau was responsible for the 
recruiting, training and equipping of Korean armed forces. 
The BND was headed by Brigadier General Lawrence Schick and 
staffed by American officers. 2/ Within days, a provisional 
program was ready and approved by General Hodge. It called 
for the formation of a 45,000 -man Army and Air Force of three 
infantry divisions supported by a 5,000 -man Navy under BND 
direction. BND's Korean defense program had to be approved 
by the Departments of Army and State in Washington before it 
could be implemented. 
Printing Office, 1962), pp. 9-10. 
Memorandum from Brig. General Schick, Provost Marshal 
General U.S. XXIV Corps to Major General Arnold, Commanding 
General USAMGIK, Subject: Plan for the National Defense of 
Korea, 31 October 1945, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
1/ Sawyer, KMAG, pp. 10-11. 
2/ Korea Gazette, Ordinance Number 28, Headquarters United 
States Army Forces in Korea, Office of the Military Governor, 
13 November 1945, Records of the Adjutant General Office, 
Administrative Services Division -Operations Branch, Foreign 
(Occupied) Area Reports 1945-54, Record Group 94, National 
Archives, Washington, D.C., Box 2062. 
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Structure of the Bureau of National Defense 1/ 
Office of the Director 
of National Defense 
I 
Bureau of the Armed Forces 
1 I 
Army 
Department 
Navy 
Department 
Bureau of Police 
While waiting for comments and approval of their Korean 
defense plan by Washington, BND officers started a Military 
Language School in Seoul. Opened on 4 December, the school's 
purpose was to ease the language difficulty by teaching 
potential Korean officers English military expressions. 2/ 
Applicants had to possess some knowledge of English and over 
60 Koreans attended the first class. 3/ 
The establishment of an "elaborate" Korean defense force was 
moving too quickly for evolving American diplomatic policy on 
Korea. The Departments of Army and State believed the 
creation of a Korean defense force signaled an American 
decision to sponsor a client state in the South. But in late 
1945, the U.S. still sought a diplomatic settlement 
1/ Ibid. 
2/ "History of Department of Internal Security to 1 July 
1948," p. 20, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record 
Group 319, Box 726. 
3/ Sawyer, KMAG, p. 12. 
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to reunify both zones through the negotiations of the U.S.- 
U.S.S.R. Joint Commission on Korea. Only when the futility 
of negotiations was evident in mid -1947, would the U.S. 
support a larger Korean defense force. Until then, caution 
dominated American planning and resource allocation for a 
Korean defense force. 
GENERAL CHAMPENY AND PLAN BAMBOO 
Washington rejected the creation of an elaborate Army and 
ordered Brigadier General Arthur Champeny, who superseded 
General Schick as Director of National Defense, to submit a 
a smaller, more practical plan. In late December, General 
Champeny's new plan, BAMBOO, was adopted. BAMBOO was a 
simple plan to develop a cadre of Korean soldiers through the 
framework of the BND. If a Korean Army formed later, this 
cadre could be the core. Initially, a 25,000 -man reserve 
force would be raised to support the police in maintaining 
internal order and although trained along infantry lines, the 
reserve force would be organized as a constabulary police 
force, not an army. It would be called the Constabulary. 1/ 
As the Constabulary expanded in size and capability, it would 
assume some of the national defense responsibilities carried 
out by the USAFIK. BAMBOO kept the Constabulary small and 
unobtrusive. 
1/ Letter from Brig. General Champeny to Captain Sawyer, 
7 March 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record 
Group 319, Box 726. 
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BAMBOO envisioned raising one infantry company 20 percent 
overstrength in each of southern Korea's eight mainland 
provinces. Companies were organized using U.S. infantry 
standards, 225 men and 6 officers. However, because of 
shortages of heavier infantry weapons (machine guns and 
mortars), there were no heavy weapons platoons. After 
training and equipping units with abandoned Japanese 
equipment, the excess men would serve as the core to recruit 
and build another company. Each succeeding company would be 
overstrength and expand in a a similar manner. Three 
companies would form a battalion and three battalions a 
regiment. 1/ Each province would have a regiment of 2,200 
men. Later, more regiments would be formed to bring 
Constabulary strength up to 25,000 men. 
THE BEGINNING OF THE CONSTABULARY 
Recruiting for the Constabulary started near Seoul on 14 
January 1946 and the units attracted many enlisted and 
officer applicants with prior military experience. These 
men came from two distinct backgrounds: those with experience 
in the Japanese or Japanese -Manchurian Army; and those with 
Chinese Army or Korean Liberation Army experience. When 
assessed, the Japanese -trained men were considered more 
professional, able and disciplined. 
1/ Ibid. 
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After being interviewed, tested and medically examined, 
selected Koreans were sent to the first Constabulary training 
and barracks area, northeast of Seoul on the Ch'unch'on Road. 
Security checks on applicants' political leanings were not 
completed. "Recruiting standards remained low and reasonably 
healthy applicants had little trouble enlisting." 1/ By 
month's end, three companies in Seoul were raised and 
training. 
For the first year, American officers commanded Constabulary 
units. Colonel John T. Marshall was the first Chief of the 
Constabulary. To develop Korean managerial and administrative 
skills, a counterpart arrangement was instituted. Koreans 
served in American offices, learning the necessary skills to 
run the Bureau eventually. 
In late January, a draft of American officers were assigned 
to Constabulary recruiting and organization duty. Pairs of 
officers, teamed with a translator and select Korean enlisted 
men from the Constabulary battalion at Seoul, were sent to 
provinces to organize companies. A daunting task faced them 
because, 
..the Department of National Defense was the last 
department to be organized in Korea. Therefore, 
buildings, office space, supplies, civilian person- 
nel, etc., which had already been allotted to other 
1/ Sawyer, KMAG, p. 26. 
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departments, had by this time become a scarcity. 
Now, at this late date, it was difficult for members 
of this organization to acquire the supplies they so 
urgently needed. 1/ 
Shortages were prevalent. Procurement of necessary supplies 
in the provinces, where American control was often tenuous, 
was time-consuming and difficult. The teams had to locate 
billets, training areas and food supplies and to procure 
abandoned Japanese weapons and equipment. 
Early on, ill will developed between the Constabulary and the 
Police. Differences erupted over jurisdiction, enforcement 
powers and supplies. In the early months, the Constabulary 
lost many bureaucratic battles with the Police. American 
commanders tended to favor the Police because of their 
immediate impact, whereas the Constabulary was still an 
infant force, incapable of helping Americans keep order. 
For example, the Constabulary felt insulted because they 
were armed with Japanese pistols and Type 99 bolt action 
rifles, while the Police were equipped with American 
sidearms and light machine guns. The only light machine 
guns the Constabulary had were gifts of souvenir Japanese 
1/ "History of Department of Internal Security to 1 July 
1948," p. 4, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record 
Group 319, Box 726. 
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guns given by American units. 1/ 
Despite being poorly trained and equipped, overstrength 
Constabulary companies were raised in each province by April 
1946. 2/ These companies were not scattered like the Police, 
but were concentrated on provincial posts in accordance to 
tactical and logistical considerations. 3/ Constabulary 
posts were established at Seoul, Pusan, Kwangju, Taegu, Iri, 
Taejon, Ch'ongju and Ch'unch'on. 4/ Total Constabulary 
strength was about 2,000 men. 
CHANGES, SPRING 1946 
Revisions were made to the BND in the spring of 1946. In 
March the Police were detached from BND and made an 
independent bureau to lessen bureaucratic infighting and 
improve the quality of the force. In April, the USAMGIK 
recognized national defense as an important government 
function and raised it from bureau to department status. 
1/ Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 24 August, 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
2/ Ibid. 
3/ "History of Department of Internal Security to 1 July 
1948," p. 19, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record 
Group 319, Box 726. 
4/ Sawyer, KMAG, pp. 16-17. 
Army 
Department 
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Development of the Constabulary slowed in June due to 
diplomatic considerations. The Russians insinuated that the 
newly titled Department of National Defense (DND) was 
evidence the Americans were not negotiating in good faith and 
were intent on creating a satellite state. The U.S., 
determined not to have their sponsorship of the DND become 
the Russian excuse to derail negotiations, redesignated 
National Defense as Internal Security. Not a Korean Army, 
the Americans contended, this force was merely a backup to 
the police in keeping civil order in the South. 1/ 
Reorganization of the Korean Defense Structure 
DEPT. OF NATIONAL DEFENSE DEPT. OF INTERNAL SECURITY 
(DND) (April 1946) 
'Bureau of Armed Forces' 
Navy 
Department 
(DIS) (June 1946) 
Bureau of 
Constabulary 
Bureau of 
Coast Guard 
Bureau of Korean Supply 
These changes underscored the lukewarm support Washington and 
the Far East Command in Tokyo under MacArthur (FEC) gave to 
expanding the Constabulary. From mid -1946 to late 1947, the 
U.S. emphasized diplomacy at the expense of military 
considerations. As General Hodge (USAFIK commander) later 
wrote: 
..I was very interested in establishing a Korean Army 
from the beginning of the Occupation...I met with much 
1/ Sawyer, KMAG, pp. 20-21. 
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVLANNILN i IN KOREA 1/ 
1/ Foreign Occupied Area Reports 
Military Government Charts 
-Korea, 
Record Group 94, Adjutant General Office, 
Administrative Services Division - 
Operations Branch, National Archives, 
Washington, D.C., Box 2,070. 
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opposition at higher levels apparently in the belief 
that at that stage of our relations such a move might 
be misunderstood by the Russians and be a source of 
difficulty...." 1/ 
But as a later author noted: 
Unfortunately, MacArthur and Washington, anxious not 
to arouse the Russians, demurred, and a modest, almost 
surreptitious, plan for a constabulary -type police 
reserve was substituted, what little was done being 
almost entirely on the initiative of Hodge and his 
staff. 2/ 
Changes to the Department of Internal Security (DIS) 
continued in September. To increase Korean responsibilities 
and lessen dependence on American supervision, Koreans were 
placed in charge of DIS and its subordinate offices. The 
Korean Director-DIS simply became the Director-DIS while the 
former American director became the Advisor-DIS. American 
officers connected with DIS became advisors, handing decision 
making to the Koreans. The official language was Korean, 
though important documents were accompanied by an English 
translation. 3/ 
1/ Letter from Lt. General Hodge to Major General Orlando 
Ward, 18 March 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, 
Record Group 319, Box 726. 
2/ Henderson, Korea: The Politics of a Vortex, p. 340. 
3/ "History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 
July 1948," pp. 14-15, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
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Despite this counterpart arrangement, Korean managerial skills 
were still inadequate. American advisors retained 
overwhelming influence and continued to make or approve all 
major decisions, ensuring that U.S. interests concerning the 
Constabulary were protected. 1/ The control of military aid 
afforded the Americans additional leverage over the 
materially poor Koreans. 
1/ Ibid. 
CHAPTER II. - CAPTAIN HAUSMAN AND THE KOREAN CONSTABULARY, 
THE FIRST SIX MONTHS. 
CAPTAIN HAUSMAN's BACKGROUND 
James H. Hausman was born on 28 February 1918 in New Jersey. 
Raised there, he dreamt about military service and living an 
adventuresome life. In 1934, facing the reality of jobless 
Depression -era America and wanting adventure, he "borrowed" 
his brother's birth certificate and at the age of 16 enlisted 
in the U.S. Army as John 0. Hausman. Between 1934 and 1940, 
he served at Fort Devers, Massachusetts, in Panama and 
elsewhere. 1/ 
Even after reaching legal enlistment age, James H. Hausman 
continued the fiction of being John O. Hausman, fearing 
discharge from the Army for enlisting under false pretenses. 
He masqueraded successfully until the Selective Service Law 
of 1940, which required all men between the ages of 18 and 35 
to register for the draft. James H. Hausman had to register, 
and brother John O. was unwilling to assume the identity of 
his younger brother James H. to conceal this problem. 
1/ Interview of Mrs. James H. Hausman by Peter Clemens, 29 
March 1988. 
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It must have taken courage for Corporal John 0. Hausman 
(actually James H.) to present this problem to his commanding 
officers. Requesting leniency, he feared retribution for his 
false enlistment. While not condoning his actions, his 
commanders saw that Corporal Hausman had a good record and 
was a motivated foot soldier. Reluctantly, the Army 
discharged him in late 1940. Until his Army records were 
corrected and he registered for the draft, he was not allowed 
to re -enlist. 1/ 
In 1941 the U.S. Army was desperate for experienced men and 
officers. James H. Hausman volunteered for service shortly 
after Pearl Harbor. In early 1942 the Army gave him a direct 
field commission of a First Lieutenant recognizing his prior 
service as John 0. Hausman. He finished officers' training 
at Fort Benning, Georgia, in June. While there, his first son 
Jimmy was born. He was assigned for much of the war as a 
recruiting, organizing and training officer for the newly 
created U.S. Army Women's Army Corps (WAC). A member of the 
first group of 17 officers assigned to this duty, First 
Lieutenant Hausman was stationed at Fort Des Moines, Iowa, 
from July 1942 to July 1943 assembling the first WAC 
batallion in the U.S. Army. 2/ 
1/ Ibid. 
2/ Ibid. 
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Daughter Judy was born in July 1943 when First Lieutenant 
Hausman was assigned to a WAC camp at Daytona Beach, Florida. 
In early 1944, he continued his organizing and training 
duties at a WAC camp in Spartansburg, South Carolina, where 
he was promoted to Captain. Though proud of his integral 
role in the far reaching social -military experiment of the 
WAC, he felt his military service during the war was perhaps 
less than heroic. He never heard a shot in anger nor even 
came remotely close to a combat area. 1/ 
Captain Hausman's excellent service record, prewar experience 
of 6 years as a Regular Army enlisted man, 4 years' duty as 
a WAC advisor and his desire to remain in the Army after the 
war allowed him to survive the drastic demobilizations 
personnel cuts of 1945 and 1946. At age 28 with 10 years of 
valuable Army experience in peace and war, he was assigned to 
Korea. 
SERVICE WITH THE 8th REGIMENT, JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1946 
Captain Hausman landed in Korea in July 1946 and was assigned 
to the USAMGIK as an advisor to the 8th Constabulary Regiment 
at Ch'unch'on in the Kangwon province about 45 miles 
northeast of Seoul. 2/ The 8th Regiment began forming on 
1/ Ibid. 
2/ Interview of Major James H. Hausman by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 21 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
DESCRIPTION: MAJOR GENERAL CHAE BYUNG DUK, CHIEF OF STAFF KOREAN ARMY, ADDRESSING KOREAN 
OFFICERS AT THE OPENING OF THE KOREAN ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL, 26 SEPTEMBER 1949. 
AMERICAN OFFICERS SEATED ON PLATFORM LEFT TO RIGHT: BRIG. GENERAL ROBERTS, MAJOR 
CLARKE, LT. COL. EDWARD, CAPTAIN HAUSMAN AND LT. COL. VIEMAN. (PHOTO SCIVR'R411) 
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27 March 1946 and recruited 225 men by the end of March. 1/ 
Originally Captain Hausman thought he was assigned to the 
American occupation force in Japan. However, though he did 
not speak or write any Korean, G-1 (Personnel) Far East 
Command believed he would be more effective in Korea. 2/ His 
experience as an organizer and trainer for the WAC made him 
suitable as an advisor to the Korean Constabulary. 
Captain Hausman traveled to Korea without his family because 
USAMGIK and USAFIK lacked facilities for dependent families, 
and Army regulations forbade dependent wives, beyond 7 months 
pregnant, to be sent overseas with their husbands. It was 9 
months before he was reunited with his family. 3/ 
He joined an advisory effort in turmoil. Turnover of 
American personnel caused by rapid U.S. Army demobilization 
hindered efforts to advise the infant Constabulary. The loss 
of institutional memory and continuity when advisors left 
1/ Republic of Korea, Military History of Korea, translated 
by the 500th Military Intelligence Service Group, 
Headquarters, United States Army Forces in the Far East, 
Records of the Army Staff, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the 
Yalu, Record Group 319, Box 747. 
2/ Interview of Mrs. James H. Hausman by Peter Clemens, 29 
March 1988. 
3/ Ibid. 
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was devastating. Working relationships between the Americans 
and Koreans were fragmented, short-lived and often not 
effective. In the early months of 1946, quality long-term 
advising was nonexistent. 
Between December 1945 and June 1946, there were four 
Directors of National Defense. Although General Champeny was 
the Director during the beginning of the Constabulary, much 
of his time from February to April 1946 was occupied with 
duties of Acting Deputy Military Governor. After General 
Champeny was promoted, two Directors followed quickly, 
Colonels Bernard and Thompson. Finally, Colonel Terrill E. 
Price was appointed as Director on 1 June. Within the 
Constabulary, the Chief of Constabulary, Colonel John T. 
Marshall, was replaced by Colonel Russell D. Barros in March. 
Captain Hausman's duty with the 8th Regiment was a valuable 
learning experience. Previous advisors accomplished little 
beyond recruiting a company of Koreans and selecting a post 
site. Some recruits continued to wear civilian clothing, 
while the others wore a mixture of Japanese and U.S. Army 
uniform remnants. Weapons were in short supply. 1/ 
1/ "History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 
July 1948," p. 8, Office of the Chief of Military History, 
Record Group 319, Box 726. 
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Because of their innate knowledge of Korea and the language, 
Captain Hausman believed in delegating responsibilities to 
promising Korean officers. This gave him more time to 
develop training, and it gave Korean officers experience in 
managing staff functions. Captain Hausman was fortunate to 
have 2nd Lieutenant Whang as Finance Officer for the 
Regiment, a man whom Captain Hausman recognized as possessing 
excellent administrative skills. He established a working 
relationship with Lt. Whang to help solve local recruiting, 
training and supply problems. 1/ 
USAMGIK government teams backed by USAFIK occupation troops 
exercised American provincial control. Invaluable 
assistance was available from both. Previous advisors for 
the 8th Regiment had rotated so quickly that they had not 
maintained any on -going liaison with local American units. 
However, Captain Hausman's emphasis on good relations with 
the American forces immeasureably helped the 8th Regiment 
obtain facilities, supplies, transportation and temporary 
special advisors. 2/ 
1/ Interview of Major James H. Hausman by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 21 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
Lt. Whang later became a General in the South Korean 
Army and was a Military Attache to the United States. 
2/ "History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 
July 1948," pp. 17-18, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
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Between July and September, Captain Hausman and Lt. Whang 
worked to improve the 8th Regiment. Uniforms and weapons 
were procured and issued to recruits. Billets were improved. 
Plans were finalized for expanding the 8th Regiment by 
recruiting another company using the excess of the first 
company as the core. 
However, DIS provided little and inconsistent direction on 
training, leaving advisors to decide what was applicable. 1/ 
Captain Hausman devoted energy to training which stressed 
the basics, drill and marksmanship. Because many Korean 
officers were instilled with a "banzai" mentality, evaluation 
and training of them in American methods of drill, tactics 
and administration was time consuming, yet extremely 
important. 2/ 
CAPTAIN HAUSMAN IS REASSIGNED 
In September, Colonel Barros, Chief of the Constabulary, 
visited Captain Hausman at Ch'unch'on. Reviewing his 
accomplishments, Colonel Barros noted the improvement and 
progress made toward welding the 8th Regiment into a cohesive 
unit. 
1/ Interview of Major James H. Hausman by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 21 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
2/ Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 4 October 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
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Although by this time, Colonel Barros had been Chief less 
than 4 months, he realized the Constabulary and advisory 
effort were struggling. Demobilization had gutted the 
advisory effort already handicapped by limited resources and 
support. Constabulary Headquarters in Seoul was a shell with 
few men, no resources and little direction. Policies were 
non-existent. Compounding these problems was the pending 
change to Korean control. 
"The evening of his visit, Colonel Barros announced he was 
going to take me (Hausman) back to Seoul with him." 1/ 
Captain Hausman was reassigned to Constabulary Headquarters 
in Seoul. The 8th Regiment would suffer the loss of an 
excellent advisor, but Colonel Barros reasoned Captain 
Hausman would be more effective reorganizing and building up 
the Constabulary Headquarters. 
This move was significant. 2/ In his new position, Captain 
Hausman wielded tremendous influence. Brigadier General 
William L. Roberts, first Chief of the U.S. Army's formal 
military advisory group to Korea (KMAG), noted Captain 
Hausman, "Had more to do with the start, the arming, 
1/ Interview of Major James H. Hausman by Captain Robert 
Sawyer, 21 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
2/ Sawyer, KMAG, p. 22. 
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equipping, moves and expansions (of the Korean Constabulary) 
than anyone else." 1/ 
Besides his new assignment in Seoul, Captain Hausman had 
another reason to think fondly of September 1946. His wife 
gave birth to their second daughter Ruth Ann. 2/ With the 
birth, arrangements could start to have the Hausman family 
sent to Korea in the spring of 1947. 
CAPTAIN HAUSMAN AT CONSTABULARY HEADQUARTERS, 
SEPTEMBER -OCTOBER 1946 
For 2 years, before establishment of a bonafide aid and 
advisory effort, American advising to the Constabulary was in 
a critical stage. Desperately short of personnel, funds, 
supplies and higher command support, a minute advisory 
mission driven by Captain Hausman, somehow created the 
Constabulary, the cadre upon which the South Korean Army was 
later built. 
During the American occupation, the old walled city in 
central Seoul hummed with activities of the American 
occupation command. Despite the late scramble for office 
space, DIS procured some offices in the Security Building in 
1/ Letter from Brigadier General William L. Roberts to 
Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 22 January 1952, Office of the 
Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
2/ Interview of Mrs. James H. Hausman by Peter Clemens, 29 
March 1988. 
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the old city. 1/ Reporting to DIS Headquarters in late 
September, Captain Hausman noted that DIS was impressively 
staffed with Koreans and a complement of 20 American 
advisors. However, he was directed to the few small back 
offices of the Bureau of Constabulary. 2/ The Constabulary 
headquarters staff consisted of Colonel Barros, Major Lee 
Hyung Koon (Special Korean advisor to the Constabulary), 2nd 
Lieutenant Yim Sohn Hah (Barros' Adjutant) and a Korean 
Sergeant. Besides these men, there was nothing else to 
the Constabulary Headquarters. Policy development was non- 
existent as were military staff functions, personnel (G-1), 
intelligence (G-2), plans & operations (G-3) and logistics 
(G-4). 3/ 
1/ Telephone Directory, Greater Seoul Area for XXIV Corps 
(WASHINGTON), Military Government (WHITEHORSE), 7th Division 
(DENVER) and Branch Exchanges, 1 March 1948, Charles H. 
Donnelly Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, 
Carlisle Barracks, PA, Box: Japan and Korea, 1946-1949. 
Irma Tenneant Materi, Irma and the Hermit, (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company, 1949), pp. 39-40. 
2/ Interview of Major Russell Geist by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 3 July 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, 
Record Group 319, Box 728. 
Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 25 September 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
3/ Interview of Major James H. Hausman by Captain Robert 
K. Sawyer, 21 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
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Captain Hausman was assigned significant responsibilities. 
Colonel Barros directed him to build up Constabulary 
Headquarters to improve and speed up the recruiting, 
training and advising programs. Trusted by Colonels Barros 
and Price, he was given carte blanche to carry out his 
duties. Scarce resources would limit implementation of 
improvements. 
ASSESSMENT OF DIS/CONSTABULARY RELATIONSHIP 
Captain Hausman first requested Lt. Whang of the 8th Regiment 
as his adjutant. 1/ Lt. Whang provided invaluable help. The 
first major project for Captain Hausman and Lt. Whang was to 
assess the bureaucratic relationship between DIS Headquarters 
and the subordinate Constabulary. In late 1946, DIS 
Headquarters dominated the Korean defense structure, 
garnering many scarce resources for its use. DIS was 
supposed to provide policy and military staff support to the 
bureaus. For the Constabulary, DIS Headquarters tried to 
manage all staff functions, G-1 to G-4. 2/ 
Despite providing some policy development, DIS proved 
incapable of administering hands-on direction for the 
Constabulary. DIS was unable and unwilling to provide the 
1/ Ibid. 
2/ "History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 
July 1948," pp. 10-11, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
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DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE 1/ 
Department of Internal Security 
Director 
Deputy Director 
t 
(G12) 1 (G-1) (G-3) (G-4) 
1 Bureau of Bureau of Bureau of Oper- Bureau of Inspector 
Personnel Intelligence ations & Training Supply General 
Administration* 
Judge Advocate 
General* 
Engineer* 
Finance* 
Ordnance* 
Signal* 
Transport* 
Bureau of Constabulary Bureau of Coast Guard Bureau of Korean Supply 
*Denotes Special Staff Function 
1/ Letter from Captain Schwartz to Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 28 March 
1953, Office of the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, 
Box 728. 
Special Reports -Korea, Government Folder, Adjutant General Office, 
Record Group 94, Box 2063. 
USAMGIK Manual of Military Government Organization and Function, 
U.S. Theatres of War, World War Two, XXIV Corps, G-2 Historical Section, 
Record Group 332, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Box 5. 
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necessary manpower resources to run the Constabulary 
correctly. With inadequate resources and attention the 
Constabulary was floundering. A headquarters was being 
developed, but the recruiting, equipping and training of the 
Constabulary and its officers was mismanaged. 1/ 
The command structure of DIS precluded the Constabulary from 
acting independently. Staff functions were duplicated at 
both the DIS and Constabulary Headquarters levels, but DIS 
dominated resulting in the Constabulary Headquarters staff 
serving as nothing more than messengers for policies 
developed by DIS. 2/ The overwhelming nature of DIS stifled 
development of Constabulary staff functions. 
Rather than accept DIS dominance, Captain Hausman understood 
DIS control was not complete. Many DIS officers, both Korean 
and American, rarely spent time in the field working with 
Constabulary units. 3/ Often, DIS policies were not 
informative and effective. Captain Hausman believed 
Constabulary Headquarters could significantly influence its 
1/ Letter from Brigadier General William L. Roberts to 
Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 22 January 1952, Office of the 
Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
2/ Sawyer, KMAG, p. 22. 
3/ Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert 
K. Sawyer, 25 September 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
-34 - 
affairs. 
Constabulary Headquarters matured in November 1946. A Korean 
Chief of Constabulary was appointed, Lt. Colonel Song Ho 
Seung, with Lt. Colonel Barros assuming the role as senior 
American advisor. Major Lee Hyung Koon was not appointed 
Chief because his Japanese Army background might have proved 
embarassing to American occupation authorities. Also, 
another regiment was activated on the island province of 
Cheju -do. 
ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSTABULARY & ADVISORY EFFORT, 
DECEMBER 1946 TO JANUARY 1947 
In December 1946 Captain Hausman began assessing the 
Constabulary and advisory program. Accompanied by Major 
Koon, he left Seoul on a trip by jeep that covered 7,000 
miles and went to every Korean province. Each company post 
of all nine Constabulary regiments was inspected. 1/ 
Regiments and advisory programs were evaluated on: quantity 
and quality of recruits and advisory personnel; level of 
rudimentary military training program; area and units advisor 
responsible for; logistics support; armaments, uniforms and 
equipment; billets; recruiting; Korean officers' potential 
1/ Interview of Major James Hausman by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 21 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
1/ USAMGIK Manual for Military Government Organization and Function, Records of U.S. Theaters 
of War, World War Two, XXIVth Corps G-2 Historical Section 1945-1948, Record Group 332, National 
Archives, Washington, D.C., Box 5. 
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and past military experience; and relationship with the local 
Police and USAMGIK unit. 
What Captain Hausman found was discouraging. Except for the 
1st Regiment at Seoul, using the name regiment for the other 
Constabulary units was polite fiction which masked weakness. 
The other eight regiments were drastically understrength, 
consisting of one to three companies. 1/ Numbering 200-600 
men actually in uniform and training, these regiments were 
not hampered by the lack of recruits but by the lack of 
supplies and equipment. 2/ In fact, ceilings were placed on 
two regiments to prevent overrecruiting. Recruiting did 
little good if funds, equipment and billets did not exist or 
could not be procured for new men. 3/ 
Recruits were of uneven quality, though many possessed prior 
military service in the Japanese or Chinese armies. The 
Korean officer corps was fractured between the Japanese and 
Chinese -trained officers. Better trained, disciplined and 
professional, the Japanese -trained officers dominated the 
1/ Ibid. 
2/ Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert 
K. Sawyer, 25 September 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
3/ Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert 
K. Sawyer, 24 August 1953, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
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Corps. Unfortunately, because security clearances were not 
performed during recruiting, disruptive politicized officers 
and men entered some units. 
Units received spotty logistics support. Critically short of 
supplies and equipment, Constabulary men were armed with 
Japanese rifles and pistols. Japanese and American uniforms. 
Food was a severe problems. The rice ration, sufficient for 
civilian consumption, did not supply enough calories and 
vitamins to offset the rigorous physical demands placed on 
Constabulary men. 1/ Billets were in short supply and 
consisted of either property confiscated from negligent 
Korean renters or buildings rented at exorbitant prices. 2/ 
In many areas relations with the Police were poor. 
Favoritism shown the Police in supplies and equipment was 
resented by Constabulary men. Police often felt superior and 
thought of the Constabulary as their reserve. Frequent 
fighting, sometimes with guns, occurred between them. 
The advisors were overwhelmed with work. In January 1947, 
six American advisors were assigned to Constabulary 
1/ "History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 
July 1948," p. 5, Office of the Chief of Military History, 
Record Group 319, Box 726. 
2/ Ibid, pp. 8 & 12. 
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Regiments. Each advisor was given responsibility for two 
regiments, often separated by up to 100 miles. To advise all 
their regimental companies, some advisors drove a circuit of 
350 miles. Although nominal control passed to Korean 
officers in December 1946, American advisors retained 
responsibility for major decisions. Advisors controlled 
training, ng, recruiting, finances, operations, 
construction and officer selection and promotion. 1/ 
Little contact was maintained between DIS and advisors, who 
were left on their own to train and promote unit cohesion and 
discipline. 2/ Since advisors were spread thin, Korean 
officers were relied upon to conduct much of the training and 
disciplining of the men. 
The language barrier hampered advising and training. There 
was an acute shortage of Korean translators, and the few 
remaining were in Seoul with the occupation command. 
Initially, Nisei (Japanese -American) translators were 
attached to advisors since many Koreans, especially the 
officers, spoke Japanese. Later, as part of the de- 
Japanization of Korea, DIS forbade the use of Japanese as a 
1/ Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert 
K. Sawyer, 23 September 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
2/ Ibid. 
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means of conversation, rendering the Nisei useless. The 
Nisei were not replaced with Korean interpretors, forcing 
advisors to continue operating under a language handicap. 1/ 
Even though many Constabulary men knew some English, carrying 
out simple instructions was a struggle. For convenience, 
many Korean Constabulary officers and advisors continued to 
use Japanese despite the ban. 2/ Training was impeded by the 
lack of training manuals translated into Korean. Advisors 
simply had little written material to distribute to 
Constabulary men. 
1/ Ibid. 
2/ Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 24 August 1953, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
CHAPTER III. - MOVING FORWARD, PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 
JANUARY 1947 TO JULY 1948 
INTRODUCTION 
Evaluations complete, Captain Hausman and Major Koon returned 
to Seoul in late January 1947. 1/ Determined not to have 
lethargy overtake the Constabulary and advisors, Captain 
Hausman believed success depended on correct use of available 
resources and promoting the Constabulary and its needs in 
DIS. 2/ He acknowledged severe problems including supply 
shortages, lack of advisors and support and the language 
barriers, but he did not accept these problems as ready 
excuses to let the Constabulary flounder. Many advisors were 
doing excellent work considering they were nearly overwhelmed 
with problems. He reasoned that an effective Constabulary 
Headquarters could provide immeasureable support. 
Building up the Constabulary and its Headquarters would not 
1/ Interview of Major James Hausman by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 21 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
2/ Letter of Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 23 September 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
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be easy. Conversations with Colonels Barros and Price (head 
of DIS) confirmed minimal support by higher headquarters for 
developing the Constabulary. The occupation command felt the 
Police more useful than the Constabulary, still considered a 
Police reserve force. The Police garnered 60 percent of the 
security budget. 1/ Constabulary supplies remained short and 
advisory personnel levels progressively fell from ten men in 
late 1946 to three men during the winter of 1947-1948. 2/ 
Captain Hausman recognized four problem areas within the 
Constabulary: recruiting; training; budget and logistics; 
and stature. Only if these problems were addressed, could 
the Constabulary develop into a legitimate national defense 
force. 
RECRUITING 
To project itself as the national defense force, Captain 
Hausman knew it was vital to reach the Constabulary author- 
ized strength of 25,000 men in 1947. At 30,000 men, the 
Police were a larger force, with better funding and more 
equipment and respect. Without adequate manpower, the 
1/ Memoradnum from the Economic Advisor for the Commanding 
General USAFIK to the Secretary of State, Subject: "National 
Budget for Fiscal Year 1 April 1947/31 March 1948," 4 
September 1947, Special Reports Korea, Adjutant General 
Office, Record Group 94, Box 2,048. 
2/ Interview of Major James Hausman by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 16 June 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
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Constabulary would continue as a Police reserve, underfunded 
and overlooked. 1/ 
An 18 month plan was devised by Captain Hausman to bring the 
Constabulary to full strength and provide it rudimentary 
training. To reach 25,000 men by years' end, drastic 
expansion was necessary since in November 1946, the 
Constabulary numbered only 4,200 and most regiments consisted 
of one or two companies. 2/ 
Captain Hausman sped up recruiting programs in early 1947. 
He encouraged advisors to hold recruiting drives in their 
units' province to form new companies. Advisor recruiting 
teams were sent throughout the provinces using radio and 
newpaper advertisements and word of mouth to attract 
recruits. New units were activated using overstrength 
companies to provide cadre for forming additional companies. 
Recruiting drives continued through the year. He envisioned 
every regiment increasing to at least three companies, by 
July 1947. This increase would form a battalion and a 
1/ Memorandum to File by General Courtney Hodge, 5 December 
1947, Records of the Army Staff, Plans and Operations 
Division (G-3) 1946-1948, Decimal File 091.Korea Section I, 
Record Group 319, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Box 
2 0 . 
2/ Memorandum for General Wedemeyer from Lt. Colonel 
Seedlock, 9 March 1948, Plans and Operations Division, 
Record Group 319, Box 20. 
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battalion headquarters. Overstrength battalion cadre would 
form two more battalions and headquarters by years' end. 
Within a year each regiment would attain full strength and 
establish a regimental headquarters in the capital of the 
province where the regiment was based. 1/ 
Captain Hausman knew there were problems with rapid 
expansion. The rush to attain full strength produced 
battalions of uneven quality. Though recruiting expanded the 
Constabulary nearly six times over during the year, many new 
recruits possessed only basic military training. There was 
also a high risk of politicially unreliable recruits 
infiltrating the ranks. 
TRAINING 
With the influx of thousands of recruits, training 
improvements were desperately needed. Captain Hausman worked 
extremely hard to implement his training ideas. Because the 
number of American advisors declined, much of his work was 
directed at the Korean officers who increasingly conducted 
more of the training. 2/ 
1/ "History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 
July 1948," pp. 18 & 19, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
2/ Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 16 June 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
(footnote continued on page 44) 
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Close Liaison With American Units 
During his tour, Captain Hausman noted that the best 
organized and recruited regiments were those in which the 
advisor worked closely with local American forces. He 
emphasized to all advisors the need to cooperate to secure 
scarce facilities. The Constabulary was simply too resource 
poor not to seek help from all quarters. 1/ 
Examples of how American assistance could improve the 
Constabulary were evident. Because the Constabulary had few 
trucks, access to U.S. Army truck transportation was an 
immense help. Recruiting areas expanded from walking 
distances to outlying provincial towns. Though regiments 
continued to recruit on a provincial basis, with accessible 
transportation the entire province could now be canvassed 
for recruits. Borrowed transportation also gave the 
Constabulary mobility to conduct training exercises and 
operations. 2/ 
Letter from Captain Schwartz to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 28 March 1953, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
1/ Interview of Major James Hausman by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 21 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
"History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 
July 1948," pp. 17 & 18, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
2/ Ibid, p. 8. 
(footnote continued on page 45) 
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Training help was also provided by American units. Advisors 
could not hope to cover adequately necessary military 
subjects with all of their regimental units. Instructors 
from U.S. units were lent temporarily to assist in the 
specialized training in American firearms, tactics and 
administrative functions. Sometimes American units hosted a 
military school for the Constabulary. The U.S. 20th Infantry 
Regiment, for example, conducted a brief school on American 
weapons training for Korean officers in March 1947. To cope 
with the new recruits, the training schedule was often upped 
to 16 hours a day, 7 days a weeks. Recreation was not 
permitted. Special classes for Korean officers and non- 
commissioned officers (NCO's) were often held nightly. 
English classes were held twice weekly. After only a few 
months of training, recruits would become the cadre upon 
which new units would form. 1/ 
Language Barriers 
Perhaps the biggest obstacle advisors faced was the language 
barrier. Relaying basic instructions was often frustrating 
and time-consuming. Korean itself was an imprecise language 
lacking translations of many technical English terms. Many 
Interview of Major James Hausman by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 21 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
1/ Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 23 September 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
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military terms had not found their way into Korean. Literal 
translations were often impossible or terribly confusing. 
Interpreting words into descriptive phrases created a machine 
gun described as gun -that -shoots -very -fast or headlight as 
candle -in -a -shiny -bowl. Interpretations were 
inconsistent. 1/ 
Captain Hausman sympathized with the plight of the advisors. 
He had landed in Korea not knowing Korean. However, with 
the help of Lt. Whang and Major Koon, he developed 
proficiency in understanding the language. But his Korean 
reading and writing skills remained basic. 2/ 
To reduce the language problem, Captain Hausman implemented 
many projects. He strongly urged advisors to develop a 
better understanding of Korean. 3/ As in his case, 
conversational Korean, supplemented with signs, was easier to 
learn than reading and writing Korean and it had an immediate 
use. Also, to alleviate confusion, all Constabulary 
Headquarters' documents were issued in both Korean and 
English, so both advisor and Constabulary men could 
understand. 
1/ Sawyer, KMAG, pp. 62-64. 
2/ Interview of Mrs. James H. Hausman by Peter Clemens, 29 
March 1988. 
3/ Ibid. 
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After his return in January 1947, he requested that DIS write 
and translate military training manuals into Korean. Written 
training materials were critically lacking. Under his 
guidance handbooks on soldiering, squad and platoon tactics and 
for officers were completed. Printed locally, the manuals 
were distributed to Constabulary men by advisors beginning in 
March 1947. 1/ 
These manuals were very valuable to the advisors. Since 
training outlines from DIS did not exist, advisors used the 
manuals as guides. Not only was training more standardized, 
but Koreans could study military lessons without the presence 
of the advisor, which unfortunately was often necessary. 
Since advisors were thinly spread much of the training was 
conducted by Korean officers who readily used the manuals. 2/ 
Despite the changes, the language barrier proved nearly 
insurmountable. 3/ Advisors continued to struggle using a 
1/ "History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 
July 1948," p. 5, Office of the Chief of Military History, 
Record Group 319, Box 726. 
Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 23 September 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
2/ Ibid. 
3/ "History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 
July 1948," p. 5, Office of the Chief of Military History, 
Record Group 319, Box 726. 
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mixture of Korean, Japanese, English and signs. 
Korean Officers 
As the Constabulary expanded, Korean Constabulary officers 
were increasingly responsible for training. Shortages of 
advisors meant Americans were not able to supervise every 
unit. 
To supply junior Constabulary officers, the Korean Training 
Center (KTC) was established on 1 May 1946. The old Military 
Language School, which provided the first draft of Korean 
officers back in early 1946 was disbanded. The KTC was a 
shell until 1947 when American and Korean advisors were 
assigned to gear up for the expansion. Activated 
progressively with the strengthening of the regiments, the 
KTC accepted Koreans as officer candidates for basic military 
and English training. Commissioned probationally, these 
officers were assigned to the newly raised units. 1/ 
Despite DIS's desire to de-Japanize Korea, Captain Hausman 
realized the need to continue recruiting Korean officers with 
prior military service in the Japanese or Chinese armies. 
Although their methods often clashed with American ideas of 
training, discipline and tactics, Captain Hausman understood 
their usefulness. With shortages of Korean and American 
1/ Ibid, pp. 17-21. 
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officers, trained men could not be overlooked simply 
because they had served on the other side in the previous 
war. These officers provided a nucleus for a Korean officer 
corps. In the absence of advisors, they conducted much of 
the basic training (drill, marching, physical fitness and 
discipline). In fact some units were still using Japanese 
drill as late as July 1948! 1/ 
Although many Korean officers adhered to "banzai" charge 
tactics and had low regard for marksmanship, not all of their 
influence was detrimental. Many saw the fallacy of American 
efforts to create a road -bound force, tied to elaborate 
supply nets. Content with ox carts, horses and marching in 
mountainous Korea, their ability to adapt to local terrain 
and use their limited resources wisely allowed the 
Constabulary to develop excellent cross-country mobility. 2/ 
As the Police reserve, Constabulary units were often called 
1/ Ha Woo Lee, "The Korean Polity Under Syngman Rhee: An 
Analysis of Its Culture, Structure and Elite" (Ph.D. disser- 
tation, The American University, 1975), pp. 154-166. 
Letter from Brigadier General William L. Roberts to 
Captain Robert K. Sawyer, 22 January 1952, Office of the 
Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
Letters from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert 
K. Sawyer, 4 October 1952 and 24 August 1953, Office of the 
Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
2/ Ibid. 
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upon to quell civil disorders the Police could not handle. 
Though disruptive to training, the disorders provided 
realistic training and gave units an opportunity to conduct 
operations at company levels. Citing the example of advisor 
Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus, Captain Hausman encouraged other 
advisors to use the disorders to exercise troop movement and 
tactics. 1/ 
Increased recruiting fleshed out the Constabulary to 25,000 
men by the end of 1947. The perseverance of the few American 
advisors and motivated Korean officers with the improvements 
in training methods and tools enabled the Constabulary to 
train most of the new recruits. Though training was 
excellent, it was limited in scope. In the fall of 1947 most 
units performed adequately in field training exercises and 
civil disorder operations. Though many Constabulary men 
continued to have only rudimentary training and units were 
uneven in quality, a cadre was slowly developing. 2/ 
BUDGET AND LOGISTICS 
To support the build-up and additional training, better 
logistical support was needed. Shortages were evident. 
1/ Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert 
K. Sawyer, 4 October 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
2/ Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 23 September 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
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Constabulary supplies and budget were controlled by DIS 
Headquarters. Captain Hausman knew the only way to obtain 
more funds, supplies and equipment was to push aggressively 
the needs of the Constabulary in DIS. 
USAMGIK budgets of fiscal years 1946 and 1947 reflect the low 
priority of the Constabulary. Revenues generated by the weak 
Korean economy plus limited American aid were not enough to 
fund adequately all the USAMGIK departments. With lukewarm 
support from higher headquarters and limited usefulness, the 
Constabulary was allotted smaller appropriations than the 
Police. The expansion needed to promote the Constabulary 
proceeded on limited funds. 
APPROPRIATIONS 1/ 
Comparsion Between the Constabulary and Police 
% Increase 
DEPARTMENT FY 1946 2/ FY 1947 2/ FY46 to FY47 
Police Y 624,743,264 V 1,584,562,600 153 
Internal Y 445,460 Y 1,750,000 
Security 
Constabulary Y 669,901,800 Y 716,250,000 
Y - Denotes Korean won currency 
293 
6 
1/ Memorandum from the Office of the Economic Advisor to 
the Commanding General USAFIK to the Secretary of State, 
Subject: National Budget for Fiscal Year 1 April 1947/31 
March 1948, 4 September 1947, Adjutant General Office, Record 
Group 94, Box 2048. 
2/ FY represents the fiscal year from 1 April to 31 March. 
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Captain Hausman believed allowing DIS free reign on managing 
the Constabulary's budget was courting disaster. Most DIS 
officers rarely ventured into the field to monitor 
Constabulary activities and they remained somewhat uninformed 
on Constabulary needs. To prevent misuse of scarce funds, he 
believed it was important that the Constabulary have input in 
the budget process. Privy to budget discussions at DIS, 
Captain Hausman was the Constabulary's budget advocate. He 
knew the needs of the Constabulary and forcefully argued for 
them, often with success. He often used the ignorance of DIS 
officers about the Constabulary matters was used to his 
advantage. 1/ 
Only careful disbursement of the limited Constabulary funds 
would keep expansion and training progressing. For Captain 
1/ Memorandum from the South Korean Interim Government, 
Office of the Military Governor to Korean Interim Legislative 
Assembly, Subject: 1947-1948 FY Budget, June 1947, Adjutant 
General Office, Record Group 94, Box 2048. 
Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 23 September 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
Interview of Major James H. Hausman by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 24 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
Interview of Mrs. James H. Hausman by Peter Clemens, 29 
March 1988. 
"History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 
July 1948," p. 6, Office of the Chief of Military History, 
Record Group 319, Box 726. 
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Hausman the administration of the budget was time-consuming. 
Food was the largest budget item. The larger caloric demands 
of the Constabulary men and the inability to procure all of 
its requirements through the USAMGIK's Provincial Food 
Service forced the Constabulary to purchase the rest of its 
food on the costly open market. Shortages and a thriving 
black market made food prices exorbitant. 1/ 
Paying the rent for leased buildings, barracks and warehouses 
was another significant money drain. Buildings suitable for 
the Constabulary were no longer available from USAMGIK. 
The Constabulary budget was hamstrung by the high prices 
charged by Korean landlords. Budget limitations made it 
extremely difficult to pay Constabulary men a decent salary. 
Although food, shelter and clothing for the men were provided 
by the Constabulary, little money was given for extra items. 
Constabulary men were unable to support their families on 
their small salaries. 2/ 
Fiscal conservatism and building emergency money reserves were 
1/ Ibid. 
Memorandum from the South Korean Interim Government, 
Office of the Military Governor to Korean Interim Legislative 
Assembly, Subject: 1947-1948 FY Budget, June 1947, Adjutant 
General Office, Record Group 94, Box 2048. 
2/ "History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 
July 1948," p. 12, Office of the Chief of Military History, 
Record Group 319, Box 726. 
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tenets of Constabulary budget handling. Because much of the 
budget was taken by recurring items, rent, food and salaries, 
little was left for procuring equipment and supplies to 
improve Constabulary units. The resulting logistical support 
of equipment and supplies was based on recycling and 
salvaging. All supplies and equipment for the Constabulary 
had to be cleared through DIS Headquarters. To prevent 
excessive requisitioning of supplies by Koreans, only 
American advisors could request procurement of items by DIS. 
Two American advisors, Major Marsh and Captain Schwartz, 
worked with the Korean head of DIS's Logistics and Supply. 
Captain Hausman kept the DIS advisors informed of 
Constabulary needs and funds for purchases were handled by 
the DIS Finance section. 1/ 
The DIS Supply situation was described by Captain Schwartz 
as "...find what you can, where you can." Unable to buy 
new American supplies and equipment due to budgetary 
limitations, DIS Supply confiscated all the Japanese supplies 
they could find and inherited surplus and discarded supplies 
and equipment from demobilizing American units. Local 
1/ Letter of Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 23 September 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
Letter from Captain Schwartz to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 28 March 1953, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
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purchases were made with the limited funds available. 1/ 
Relying on salvage gave the Constabulary a Japanese look with 
an American accent. Arms were exclusively Japanese pistols 
and rifles, many inherited from the Police in poor condition. 
Japanese or rebuilt U.S. Army trucks made up the 
transportation inventory. Only when enough cloth became 
available in late 1947 were standard uniforms made locally 
and overcoats tailored from U.S. blankets. 2/ 
The two DIS procurement officers alone could not possibly 
find, purchase or confiscate all classes of needed supplies 
and equipment. As a result, procurements would not be made 
because there was not enough staff. Transportation and 
storage of supplies were other on -going problems. It was 
nearly impossible to transport supplies unloaded at Inchon to 
the DIS supply depot at Young Dong Po. The supplies that did 
reach Young Dong Po were often stored outside because 
adequate warehouse space was rarely available. As a result 
supplies were often lost to theft; a problem all Americans 
1/ Ibid. 
2/ Ibid. 
Memorandum from Colonel William Biddle to Director of 
the Plans and Operations Division, TAB B, General Staff, U.S. 
Army, 20 November 1947, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), 
Record Group 319, Box 22. 
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faced in postwar Korea. 1/ 
STATURE 
INTRODUCTION 
In order for the Constabulary to prosper, its governmental 
position had to improve. In principle, the Constabulary 
remained a reserve force for the Police through 1947, though 
its measured growth in strength and capabilities caused 
conflicts with the Police. 2/ It was humstrung by a 
restricted mission and DIS domination. 
The failure of U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations to reach a mutually 
acceptable agreement altered the Constabulary's role. Under 
American tutelage, the southern zone progressed toward 
independence by mid -1948 and the U.S. supported expansion of 
the Constabulary to protect the new republic. 
POLICE/CONSTABULARY RELATIONS 
From the start, the Constabulary had poor relations with the 
Police. Professional jealously, jurisdictional disputes and 
politics created distrust and animosity. Despite Captain 
Hausman's and other advisors' best efforts to reduce 
1/ Letter from Captain Schwartz to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 28 March 1953, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
Materi, Irma and the Hermit, pp. 188-191. 
2/ Sawyer, KMAG, p. 26. 
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friction, violence often flared. 
Jurisdictional Disputes 
Jurisdictional disputes soured relations. Separated from the 
Police during the June 1946 BND reorganization, the 
Constabulary's mission remained as a reserve force for the 
Police. As the Constabulary grew, this mission became too 
limited. 
Despite increasing participation and effectiveness in 
quelling civil disturbances, the Constabulary lacked Police 
powers of arrest and search. When necessary however, the 
Constabulary ignored these limitations. The Police resented 
the Constabulary's usurping of their power and often 
retaliated by arresting Constabulary men for simply being off 
their so-called military bases. 1/ 
Politics 
Political conflicts fractured relations. Political 
differences between members of the Police and Constabulary were 
apparent. Politically, the Police were a homogenous force of 
"Rightists", extremely conservative and suspicious of the 
left wing political leanings of many Constabulary men. 
1/ Letter of Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 24 August 1953, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
Sawyer, KMAG, p. 26. 
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When the Americans organized the Constabulary, they wanted 
to draw recruits across the political spectrum to foster 
a national force for all Koreans. However, in the postwar 
political chaos, most major political parties had "private 
armies" to provide political muscle. Lower recruiting 
standards and few political background checks enabled 
recruits from politicized "private armies" to join the 
Constabulary easily. Thus many radical politicized recruits, 
often "Leftists", joined, and hid behind the Constabulary 
uniform to continue their political activities. Infiltration 
of units by Communist and other radical dissidents was 
commonplace. It was not until the Yosu mutiny of October 
1948 that the Constabulary purged its ranks of dissidents and 
began screening recruits for political reliability. 1/ 
Professional Jealously 
Many Constabulary men felt they were taking a backseat to the 
Police. 2/ For many Constabulary men, especially those with 
prior Japanese experience, kowtowing to the Police was 
humiliating. When under Japanese control, the Police had 
1/ Sawyer, KMAG, p. 26. 
Interview of Major James H. Hausman by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 24 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
Letter of Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 23 September 1952 and 24 August 1953, Office of the 
Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
2/ Ibid. 
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been commanded by the Army. They had enjoyed no 
independence. However, under the Americans, the situation 
was reversed. 1/ The favoritism shown the Police by the 
American occupation command was manifest: the 1947 Police's 
budget was twice that of the Constabulary's; American 
pistols, carbines and light machine guns were issued to the 
Police in 1945 and 1946, whereas the Constabulary continued 
using Japanese arms; there were more American advisors 
assigned to the Police; and the mission of the Constabulary 
remained limited to a reserve force. 
Violence between these forces erupted frequesntly during 
1947. Most originated with the arbitrary Police arrest of 
Constabulary men off Constabulary bases. The worst such 
incident resulted from the arrest of an ex -Japanese Army non- 
commissioned officer in Yongam. In two hours of fighting, 23 
Police and Constabulary men were killed. 2/ 
Although Captain Hausman believed the rifts were incurable, 
he and the other Constabulary advisors instituted measures to 
reduce tension: joint Police and Constabulary patrols; 
military police help manning police boxes; and regular 
1/ Ibid. 
2/ Letter of Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 24 August 1953, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
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conferences to promote cooperation. Though the Police and 
Constabulary cooperated somewhat to keep internal order, 
jealousy and distrust pervaded their relationship. 1/ 
AUGMENTATION OF THE CONSTABULARY 
Captain Hausman and other DIS advisors realized the 
Constabulary needed a new mission separate from that of the 
Police to solve the Police Constabulary conflict. While the 
Constabulary remained weak, the role of Police reserve was 
adequate. However, by the Fall of 1947 the Constabulary's 
strength was nearly equal to that of the Police and 
Constabulary men chafed under their restrictions 
Diplomatic events changed Constabulary fortunes. The U.S. 
and U.S.S.R. failed to achieve a mutually agreeable 
settlement to reunite the zones. This failure moved each 
zone toward separate independence under the tutelage of the 
occupying power. Subsequently, U.S. policy began shifting 
toward creation of a strong national army to protect the 
South and this provided Captain Hausman an opportunity to 
define a new role for the Constabulary. 
1/ Ibid. 
Interview of Major James H. Hausman by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 21 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
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American Diplomacy in Korea -- 1947 & 1948 
The futility of American -Russian negotiations to reunite the 
zones was apparent by mid -1947. The Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
Commission on Korea, suspended for a year in 1946 to 1947 met 
again from April to June 1947, but to no avail. Reluctantly, 
the U.S. concluded that an acceptable solution to the Korean 
problem was not possible through direct talks with the 
U.S.S.R. 
One goal of U.S. policy in Korea was to withdraw American 
military forces without simply abandoning the South to 
Russian domination. Unfortunately, demobilization had left 
the U.S. with limited forces by 1947. The 45,000 troops of 
USAFIK were needed elsewhere in more important trouble 
spots. 1/ Korea was considered, 
..a military liability...and the United States 
has little strategic interest in keeping bases 
and troops in Korea. 2/ 
In the Fall, the U.S. took the Korean problem to the United 
Nations (U.N.). Using its influence, the U.S. forced a 
resolution through the General Assembly in October, calling 
1/ Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in 
Crisis, Credibility, and Command, (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1986), pp. 17-18. 
2/ Memorandum from the Joint Chief of Staff to the 
Secretary of Defense, Subject: "Military Importance of 
Korea," 23 September 1947, Plans and Operations Division 
(G-3), Record Group 319, Box 22. 
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for U.N. supervised elections in both zones. After the 
elections, a joint Korean government with members from both 
zones would form. When the new Korean government matured and 
its self-defense force was ready, the occupying armies would 
withdraw and a united Korea would emerge. Though many U.N. 
members were reluctant to support the American plan, they 
knew Russian obstinacy precluded other options short of 
abandoning the peninsula to communism. 1/ 
U.N. approval of the resolution, in the face of stern Russian 
opposition and counter proposals, was a diplomatic coup for 
the U.S. A temporary U.N. commission was formed and planning 
for the election started. The U.S.S.R. balked at cooperating 
and refused to hold elections in the their zone. Rebuffed, 
the U.S. pushed for a U.N. resolution that permitted elect- 
ions to proceed in the South. In February, the U.N. approved 
the resolution and southern elections were set for May 1948. 
Independence for the South would follow in the summer. 2/ 
1/ John Merrill, "Internal Warfare in Korea, 1948-1950: 
The Local Setting of the Korean War," In Child of Conflict, 
ed. Bruce Cumings (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1983), p. 139. 
Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in 
the United Nations, (New York: Kraus Reprint Company, 1972), 
pp. 46-65. 
2/ James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade, (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1983), pp. 124-139. 
Merrill, Internal Warfare, p. 140. 
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The U.N. acceptance of the U.S. plan hardened the division 
of Korea. Although the Americans knew from the beginning, 
that Russian participation in the U.N. approved American plan 
was unlikely, they proceeded. The essential diplomatic 
problem was that neither side was willing to abandon the 
peninsula to the other, making unification hopeless. 1/ 
By mid -1947, Korean politics in the South were extremely 
polarized between the Left and Right. Moderates were 
dwindling in influence. South Korean political parties 
failed to resolve their differences and establish a political 
consensus to form a government under American tutelage. 
Frustrated and with serious misgivings, the American 
occupation command backed the extreme Right led by Syngman 
Rhee. Despite Rhee's incessant opposition to many American 
occupation policies, the Americans considered him the only 
acceptable. All other major Korean political parties opposed 
the American plan of separate elections. Therefore, the 
American occupation command allowed him to pack the Police 
and the Korean Interim Government with his Rightist 
supporters. With American backing, Rhee swamped his 
opponents in the U.N. supervised election and he quickly 
formed a Rightist government to assume power in the South on 
1/ Matray, Crusade, pp. 136-139. 
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15 August 1948, Korean independence day. 1/ 
U.S. Plans for Constabulary Expansion -- Fall 1947 
In October 1947, as the Americans began moving the South 
toward independence, the Department of Army directed Generals 
MacArthur and Hodge to formulate plans for expanding the 
Korean Constabulary. General Hodge directed Major General 
Tyson, USAFIK's G-3 (Plans and Operations) to draw up plans 
for enlarging the Constabulary into a national defense force. 
General Tyson, who possessed only rudimentary knowledge of 
the Constabulary, ordered Colonel Price and Captain Hausman 
to do the detailed work on the USAFIK recommendation. 2/ 
Captain Hausman's knowledge of the Constabulary allowed him 
to shape the proposal. Theorizing that a South Korean 
government would face a hostile North Korea backed up by a 
Russian -trained Korean army of 150,000 to 200,000 men capable 
of rapid supply from the U.S.S.R., Captain Hausman argued 
200,000 men were necessary to provide for an adequate 
1/ Kaufman, The Korean War, pp. 
Carl Bercer, The Korea Knot, 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), pp. 
12-20. 
(Philadelphia: University 
47-76. 
2/ Messa7e WAR 88572 from the Department of the Army to 
Commander in Chief -Far East, General MacArthur, 16 October 
1947, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record Group 319, 
Box 22. 
Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 24 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
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defense of South Korea. To support this force, the embryonic 
Constabulary technical services branches (Quartermaster, 
Transport, Signal, Repair, etc.) would also expand. Also, 
the status of the Constabulary would need to change from 
Police reserve to national army. National defense would be 
the Constabulary's new mission: patrolling and protecting 
the South's borders; and quelling major internal 
disturbances, such as the growing Communist insurgency. 1/ 
Captain Hausman argued for dramatic expansion based on his 
belief that the Constabulary was well trained, motivated and 
capable of rapid expansion. To make the force more reliable, 
recruits' backgrounds would be screened to exclude subversive 
elements. Given sufficient advisory personnel and funds, 
Captain Hausman believed training and equipping this expanded 
force would take a year. 2/ 
1/ Ibid. 
Memorandum from Plans & Operations Divison to Lt. 
Colonel Conway, Subject: South Korean Armed Forces, 18 
November 1947, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record 
Group 319, Box 22. 
2/ Ibid. 
Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 24 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
Memorandum by Colonel William Biddle to the Plans & 
Operations Division, Subject: South Korean Constabulary, 20 
November 1947, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record 
Group 319, Box 22. 
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In late October 1947, General Tyson gave General Hodge an 
expansion plan calling for the creation of a South Korean 
Army of 200,000 divided into six divisions with appropriate 
headquarters and technical service elements. A large U.S. 
Army advisory program would train and equip this force within 
a year. General Hodge wholeheartedly backed the proposal and 
sent it to General MacArthur for his endorsement. 1/ 
General MacArthur was reluctant to support the proposal for 
fear that it would wreck American diplomacy at the U.N. He 
believed U.N. members would interpret the proposal to create 
an army as confirmation that the U.S. had given up on 
unification and was determined to establish an independent 
South. Therefore, he recommended that the Department of Army 
delay the proposal until after the U.N. decided on Korea. 
The Department of Army concurred. 2/ 
1/ Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 24 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
Memorandum from Plans & Operations Divison to Lt. 
Colonel Conway, Subject: South Korean Armed Forces, 18 
November 1947, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record 
Group 319, Box 22. 
2/ Ibid. 
Message CX 52266 from the Commander in Chief Far East 
Command to the Department of the Army, 22 October 1947, Plans 
and Operations Division (G-3), Record Group 319, Box 22. 
Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 24 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
-67 - 
Waiting -- Winter 1947/1948 
The Winter of 1947-1948 was the low point of the U.S. 
advisory operation. Expansion of the Constabulary and advisory 
effort was put on hold until the U.N. decided on what to do 
with Korea. In the interim, advisors could only wait and let 
diplomatic events take their course. In the face of 
Washington's desire to downplay the Constabulary, at least 
temporarily, General Hodge opted to do the minimum to sustain 
it and advisory effort. 1/ 
Few resources were spent and replacements for American 
advisors who rotated back to the U.S. failed to materialize. 
That Winter, the number of American advisors with the 
Constabulary fell to three while the advisors to DIS hovered 
between three and four. 2/ Initially, General Hodge wanted 
to proceed with some of the expansion plan, notably re - 
equipping the Constabulary with heavier American weapons: 
1/ Memorandum from Plans & Operations Divison to Lt. 
Colonel Conway, Subject: South Korean Armed Forces, 18 
November 1947, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record 
Group 319, Box 22. 
Memorandum by Colonel William Biddle to the Plans & 
Operations Division, Subject: South Korean Constabulary, 20 
November 1947, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record 
Group 319, Box 22. 
Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 16 June 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
2/ Ibid. 
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heavy machine guns, 81mm mortars and 105mm howitzers. 
However, as General MacArthur advised General Hodge, 
..in order to maintain the appearance of the 
Constabulary as a police -type reserve force, no 
weapon heavier than a light machine gun should 
be issued. 1/ 
General Hodge delayed his decision. 
As the Constabulary approached full strength in January 1948, 
the shortage of advisors diluted American influence. There 
were two American field advisors for nine regiments, one Lt. 
Colonel DeReus who was responsible for advising six regiments 
and an operational task force on Cheju -do, a total of 16,500 
men. With the departure of Colonel Barros to be Military 
Governor of Cheju -do, only Captain Hausman remained at 
Constabulary Headquarters. Subsequently, nearly all the 
training and operations were conducted by Korean officers. 2/ 
Between December 1947 and February 1948, advisors continued 
training and developing staff functions, but until more 
1/ Memorandum by Colonel William Biddle to the Plans & 
Operations Division, Subject: South Korean Constabulary, 20 
November 1947, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record 
Group 319, Box 22. 
2/ Letter from Lt. Colonel C.C. DeReus to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 23 September 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 16 June 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
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resources were allotted, there was little more this handful 
of advisors could do. Major Russell Geist aptly described 
the advisory situation, 
....transferred to USAMGIK in Seoul in early March 
1948. When I reported in to Constabulary Head- 
quarters, I found a group of small offices overrun 
with Koreans. Finally located Captain Hausman in a 
back office. Colonel Price (Head of DIS) was out 
preparing to leave for ZI (Zone of the Interior, the 
U.S.) and he didn't care about anything. Nobody 
else showed up for several days...no equipment... 
no nothing. 1/ 
Revival -- Spring 1948 
In February, U.N. acceptance of the American request to super- 
vise elections in the South meant an independent southern 
regime would emerge within 6 months. The expansion plan 
was revived. On 6 February, General MacArthur cabled to the 
Department of Army, a plan to expand the Constabulary to 
50,000 men only a fourth of the force proposed by Captain 
Hausman. The Constabulary would form five brigades each with 
three regiments. American equipment would be furnished as 
USAFIK units demobilized. General MacArthur felt USAFIK 
lacked capability to support a Constabulary expansion to 
200,000 men, but he was confident an expansion to 50,000 men 
1/ Interview of Major Russell Geist by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 3 July 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, 
Record Group 319, Box 728. 
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could be effected before the May election. 1/ As he said in 
his cable to Washington, 
This plan will accomplish the effect intended of 
enabling the U.S. government to withdraw from Korea 
without having "abandoning" it. 2/ 
On 10 March 1948, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved the 
increase. 
The mission of the expanded Constabulary was defined by 
General MacArthur as, 
....maintaining internal order under conditions 
of political strife and inspired disorder. 
...maintaining border patrols and of offering 
token resistance to invasion from the North.... 3/ 
1/ Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 24 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
Memorandum for the Record by Lt. Colonel Seedlock, Plans 
& Operations Division, Subject: South Korean Constabulary, 6 
February 1948, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record 
Group 319, Box 20. 
Memorandum from General MacArthur to General Wedemeyer, 
Commanding General G-3, General Staff, The Department of 
Army, Subject: Requirements for Establishment of a South 
Korea Army, 5 December 1947, Plans and Operations Division 
(G-3), Record Group 319, Box 20. 
2/ Memorandum for the Record by Lt. Colonel Seedlock, Plans 
& Operations Division, Subject: South Korean Constabulary, 6 
February 1948, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record 
Group 319, Box 20. 
3/ Memorandum from General Wedemeyer, Commanding General 
G-3, General Staff The Department of the Army to General 
Omar Bradely, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Subject: Table of 
Organization and Equipment for Augmented Korean Constabulary, 
7 June 1948, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record 
Group 319, Box 20. 
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In 1948 the U.S. did not intend to give the Constabulary 
offensive power. The group was seen as a defensive internal 
security force to be employed against guerrillas and small 
North Korean raiding parties. The choice of arms for the 
Constabulary was based on this assumption. Besides American 
infantry weapons, the Constabulary was given limited 
equipment: only 91 105 mm howitzers, a 6 month supply of 
ammunition, no tanks and no aircraft. 1/ 
Shortly after Captain Hausman heard about General MacArthur's 
proposal, he requested DIS to increase recruiting quietly. 
Colonel Price concurred. During February and March 1948, 
25,000 men were recruited into the Constabulary in 
anticipation of JCS approval of the expansion. In May, the 
Constabulary reorganized into brigades. 2/ 
1/ Ibid. 
Memorandum from General Hodge to General MacArthur, 
Subject: Table of Organization and Equipment for Augmented 
Korean Constabulary, 19 April 1948, Plans and Operations 
Division (G-3), Record Group 319, Box 20. 
Memorandum for the Record by Lt. Colonel Gilchrist, 
Subject: Cannon Companies for the South Korean Constabulary, 
23 June 1948, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record 
Group 319, Box 20. 
2/ Interviews of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 24 January 1952 and 16 June 1952, Office of the Chief 
of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
Memorandum from Lt. Colonel Seedlock to General 
Wedemeyer, Commanding General G-3, General Staff, The 
(footnote continued on page 72) 
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U.S. policy secured the creation of a separate southern regime. 
However, the Department of Army, wanting to close its military 
commitment by the end of the year, ordered General Hodge on 8 
April to prepare a Korean defense force to assume the 
military responsibilities of USAFIK. To support this effort, 
a formal U.S. Army military advisory mission was to be 
established upon Korean independence. 1/ 
Four months before independence, General Hodge realized the 
current advisory effort was almost nonexistent. To improve 
the Constabulary, he ordered USAFIK units to provide 
training. American officers were detailed to DIS as short- 
term advisors and U.S. units conducted schools on American 
equipment and tactics for Constabulary men. This influx of 
USAFIK advisors enabled the Constabulary to receive thorough 
intensive training which lasted through the summer of 1948, 
especially to accommodate the mass influx of new recruits. 
To increase firepower, General Hodge authorized demobilizing 
USAFIK units to turn their weapons over to the Constabulary. 
Korean units were reequipped with American M-1 carbines, .30 
Department of Army, Subject: Notes for Directors Meeting, 9 
March, 1948, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), Record 
Group 319, Box 20. 
1/ Message WAR 99374 from the Department of Army to 
Commanding General USAFIK, General Hodge, 8 April 1948, Plans 
and Operations Division (G-3), Record Group 319, Box 22. 
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caliber machine guns and 60mm and 81mm mortars. 1/ 
REORGANIZATION OF DIS -- JUNE 1948 
Brigadier General William L. Roberts replaced Colonel Price 
as the advisor to Director-DIS on 20 May 1948. The 
Department of Army believed General Roberts, slated to head 
the formal U.S. Army advisory group in August, would gain 
valuable experience serving in DIS. General Roberts knew 
very little about his new assignment. Wanting an indepth 
briefing on DIS, he consulted senior USAMGIK officers for a 
recommendation on who could provide such an orientation. 
Captain Hausman was the obvious choice. 2/ 
Conference for General Roberts -- May 1948 
General Roberts called Captain Hausman in to request 
preparation of an orientation conference. Captain Hausman 
had only a few days to prepare. The conference which, lasted 
9 hours, was primarily between General Roberts and Captain 
1/ Memorandum from General Hodge to General MacArthur, 
Subject: Table of Organization and Equipment for Augmented 
Korean Constabulary, 19 April 1948, Plans and Operations 
Division (G-3), Record Group 319, Box 20. 
Interview of Major Russell Geist by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 3 July 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, 
Record Group 319, Box 728. 
Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 24 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
2/ Letter from General William Roberts to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 22 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
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Hausman and all aspects of DIS and the Constabulary were 
covered. 1/ The conference gave Captain Hausman an 
opportunity to express his dissatisfaction with the 
organizational structure of DIS, with which he had lived with 
since September 1946. This conference gave him a unique 
opportunity to convince General Roberts to alter it. 2/ 
Captain Hausman presented his arguments for changing the DIS 
command structure to General Roberts. As Captain Hausman 
later said, 
All major decisions concerning the Constabulary were 
made by DIS, so that the Constabulary's staff was 
little more than a liaison group between DIS and the 
regiments. Obviously, such a condition severely 
restricted the Constabulary's breath of action, and 
I felt that progress in organization and training 
would be sped up if the foregoing functions were 
removed from the direct jurisdiction of DIS and placed 
under the Constabulary. 3/ 
Captain Hausman firmly believed that DIS was incapable of 
running the Constabulary and that DIS control over 
Constabulary units was nominal at best. He felt the command 
1/ Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 24 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
2/ Ibid. 
Sawyer, KMAG, p. 32. 
3/ Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 24 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
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structure was top heavy and unable to coordinate policies: 
DIS would veto what the Constabulary Headquarters had 
approved and vice versa; duplicated staff functions at DIS 
and Constabulary Headquarters levels drained experienced 
officers, already in short supply, away from the troops who 
desperately needed them; and Constabulary men were constantly 
confused about where DIS authority left -off and Constabulary 
authority picked up. Often bad feelings developed when DIS 
continually meddled in Constabulary affairs, overruling 
decisions of Constabulary officers. Because DIS rarely 
sent its officers into the field to serve with Constabulary 
units, Captain Hausman felt DIS control of Constabulary 
supplies, finances and technical assistance was a disaster. 
Consequently, DIS could not respond to the rapidly changing 
situations the Constabulary faced in the provinces. 1/ 
General Roberts' initial experience at DIS confirmed what 
Captain Hausman had told him. As General Roberts later wrote 
1/ Ibid. 
Letter from General William Roberts to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 22 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
Interview of Major Russell Geist by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 3 July 1952, Office of the Chief of Military History, 
Record Group 319, Box 728. 
"History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 July 
1948," pp. 9-10, Office of the Chief of Military History, 
Record Group 319, Box 726. 
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I found two large Constabulary Headquarters... 
viz DIS and KA. Physically they were in two 
buildings nearly adjacent and the offices of each 
were intermingled. There were many Korean officers 
being used in these headquarters who were unnecessary 
when the troops were woefully short of them. It was 
evident that only one headquarters was necessary and 
desirable for many reasons,...there were two Chiefs 
of Staff, neither good, one for DIS and one for KA. 
What had been done was to build up the top with 
little at the bottom. 1/ 
Captain Hausman's Reorganization Plan 
General Roberts heeded Captain Hausman's arguments, ordering 
him to draw up plans for a more efficient Korean defense 
structure, de-emphasizing DIS and giving the Constabulary 
more control over its own affairs. 2/ In early June, Captain 
Hausman presented his reform plan to General Roberts. He 
urged General Roberts quickly to make any changes in the plan 
and approve it. Captain Hausman knew much of the advisors' 
power would evaporate when USAMGIK ended at Korean 
independence in August. To enforce such a far reaching 
change in the emerging nation's security force, the advisors 
had to act quickly to put it in place before independence. 
General Roberts approved the plan and implementation began on 
1/ Letter from General William Roberts to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 22 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
KA in General Roberts letter refers to the 
Constabulary. The Korean Army was not formally established 
until 15 December 1948. 
2/ Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 24 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
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25 June 1948. 1/ 
The Hausman plan completely overhauled the command structure. 
DIS Headquarters was changed to the Office of the Director of 
DIS (ODDIS), and the large military staffs formerly attached 
to DIS were taken away. ODDIS was supported by seven, three - 
person staffs: Chief of Personnel; Chief of Intelligence; 
Chief of Supply and Procurement; Chief of Operations; a 
Budget and Finance Officer; Chief of Public Relations; and a 
Legislative Assistant. Each staff consisted of a Chief, 
usually a military officer, an assistant and clerk, and these 
staffs served as liaisons between ODDIS and the staffs of the 
Constabulary. 2/ 
Attached to ODDIS was the Chief of Staff for the Constabulary 
who now possessed decision making power formerly held by DIS. 
Supporting the Constabulary's Chief of Staff were the the 
Constabulary military staffs which now operated independently 
of ODDIS. The policies and procedures developed by the 
Constabulary staffs were sent through ODDIS for approval and 
1/ Ibid. 
Letter from General William Roberts to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 22 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
2/ "History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 July 
1948," pp. 9, 10, 11 & 15, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
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issuance as an ODDIS directive. ODDIS did not create 
policies without the apporval of the Constabulary staff 
approval. 1/ 
The combining of the two former staffs produced a surplus of 
American advisors and Korean officers at Constabulary 
Headquarters. These extra officers were quickly sent to 
Constabulary units in the field. 2/ 
The relationship between DIS and the Constabulary changed. 
ODDIS became a civilian office which provided general policy 
direction and liaison between the Constabulary and the other 
Korean government bureaus. Now, the Constabulary was 
responsible for managing its own affairs. As the DIS History 
describes it, 
...the main reins of control were placed in the 
hands of the Korean officers. The first major step 
had been made toward placing this army in such a pos- 
ition that it could function under its own power. 3/ 
Captain Hausman's plan had a tremendous positive impact on 
1/ Ibid. 
Letter from General William Roberts to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 22 January 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
2/ "History of the Department of Internal Security to 1 July 
1948," p. 11, Office of the Chief of Military History, 
Record Group 319, Box 726. 
3/ Ibid., p. 15. 
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developing the Constabulary. Incessant DIS meddling was 
reduced, morale was higher, Constabulary staff functioning 
developed and Constabulary Headquarters was better able to 
handle units in the provinces. When General Roberts held his 
last weekly staff meeting as head of the U.S. Army's Korean 
Military Advisory Group on 10 June 1950, he listed Captain 
Hausman's reorganization of DIS was one of the far-reaching 
accomplishments of his tenure. 1/ 
1/ Highlights of the Weekly Staff Meeting, U.S. Military 
Advisory to the Republic of Korea, 10 June 1950, Office of 
the Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 
727. 
CHAPTER IV. - CAPTAIN HAUSMAN'S SECOND TOUR, 
JULY 1948 TO JULY 1950 
SUMMER 1948 
After 2 1/2 years of struggling, the advisory effort finally 
began to receive adequate resources during the summer of 
1948. Personnel, equipment and funds were made available. 
Additional resources were allocated in June when the 
Department of Army, recognizing the larger security needs of 
the South, authorized further expansion of the Constabulary 
to 65,000 men. Also, American advising would continue after 
Korean independence, for all advisory personnel would form 
into the Provisional Military Advisory Group (PMAG) under 
General Roberts. Planned as an independent U.S. Army aid 
mission PMAG was attached to the new U.S. embassy. 
General Roberts spent May to August 1948 preparing for PMAG 
and learning the intricacies of advising the Koreans. He 
knew that although PMAG would begin with over 100 advisors, 
they would have little advisory experience. By June 1948, 
only two experienced advisors remained, Lt. Colonel DeReus 
and Captain Hausman, and both were nearing the end completing 
their 2 year tours. When these advisors left, General 
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Roberts feared the loss of knowledge to the advisory effort 
would be devastating. Continuity would be disrupted and 
inefficiencies created. New advisors often had little idea 
how to accomplish tasks. 
General Roberts relied heavily on Captain Hausman for 
guidance. He viewed Captain Hausman as the institutional 
memory of the advisory effort and was tremendously impressed 
by, "His honesty, sincerity and selflessness...". 1/ To be 
an effective commander of PMAG, General Roberts knew he 
needed an experienced advisor. In June, General Roberts 
asked Captain Hausman to stay for another 2 -year tour and to 
serve as his advisor. Captain Hausman accepted with no 
reservations. 2/ 
When Lt. Colonel DeReus left Korea in late June 1948, Captain 
Hausman was the last advisor left from the 1945-1946 period. 
Captain Hausman became the link between the early primitive 
advisory effort and the new well established one. His 
knowledge made him invaluable to General Roberts and PMAG. 3/ 
1/ Letter from General William Roberts to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 9 November 1951, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
2/ Interview of Mrs. James H. Hausman by Peter Clemens, 29 
March 1988. 
3/ Letter from General William Roberts to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 9 November 1951, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
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PMAG was formally established on 15 August 1948, South Korea 
independence day. General Roberts, at Captain Hausman's 
urging, retained the counterpart arrangement started in 1945. 
As Colonel Ralph Hansen later explained, 
..the policy of General Roberts provided that 
the individual advisor would live intimately 
with his (Korean) counterpart. ...General 
Roberts insisted that an advisor could not 
know his counterpart nor understand his 
thinking, unless they had desks in the same 
office, attended social functions together, made 
troop inspections together, and otherwise 
reached a common understanding on mutual daily 
problems. 1/ 
With the creation of PMAG, Captain Hausman's role changed. 
No longer was he the Constabulary's "father -creator," solely 
responsible for countless projects and solving innumerable 
problems while given no resources to work with. Instead, 
General Roberts needed a single counterpart to the Chief of 
Staff, the top Korean officer of the Constabulary, and to the 
Korean Minister of Defense. This position demanded a tactful 
American officer with Korean military experience, who had the 
trust of senior Korean officers. Captain Hausman was 
immediately detailed. He would report to General Roberts 
1/ Letter from Colonel Ralph W. Hansen to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 2 August 1952, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
Interview of Lt. Colonel Martin 0. Sorensen by Captain 
Robert K. Sawyer, 17 December 1952, Office of the Chief of 
Military History, Record Group 319, Box 728. 
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through the PMAG Chief of Staff, Colonel W.H.S. Wright. 1/ 
Captain Hausman served in this position until February 1951, 
providing advice, direction and comfort on American military 
matters to five Korean Chiefs of Staff. Important for the 
advisory effort was his ability to keep General Roberts, 
....informed of Korean projects soon enough to 
enable me (General Roberts) to modify or stop 
them if they were without merit. 2/ 
TO THE KOREAN WAR -- FALL 1948 TO JUNE 1950 
Captain Hausman's ability to dominate and influence the 
Constabulary subsided after independence. PMAG strength 
started with 100 advisors and jumped to 241 by years' end. 
The following summer, PMAG gave way to KMAG, U.S. Army Korean 
Military Advisory Group, a 500 -man unit with a $20 million 
budget. The days of only three American advisors for the 
Constabulary were finished. The sheer number of advisors the 
U.S. was devoting to improve the army of South Korea diluted 
1/ Memorandum from Colonel J.W. Frazer to Director Plans 
and Operations Division, Subject: Table of Distribution for 
KMAG, 4 November 1948, Plans and Operations Division (G-3), 
Record Group 319, Box 20. 
Letters from General William Roberts to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 9 November 1951 and 22 January 1952, Office of the 
Chief of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
2/ Letter from General William Roberts to Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 9 November 1951, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
1/ Semi -Annual Report of the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of 
Korea. Annexes 1-4, Period Ending 31 December 1949, Records of the Army Staff, Plans and 
Operations Division (G-3), Decimal File Korea Section I -A to 091.Netherlands, Record Group 
319, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Box 163. 
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Captain Hausman's dominating role. 
Captain Hausman ceased being responsible for all Constabulary 
matters and instead became a specialist, a liaison officer 
between General Roberts and the Koreans. Although his 
responsibilities were less than what he had during 1946 to 
1948, he had a unique position within PMAG. He served as a 
counterpart to the following Korean Chiefs of Staff: 
NAME 
Song Ho Seung 
Lee Ung Jun 
Chae Byung Duk 
Shin Tai Yung 
Chae Byung Duk 
Chung Il Kwong 
APPOINTED 
23 December 1946 
20 November 1948 
May 1949 
1 October 1949 
14 April 1950 
1 July 1950 1/ 
In his relationship with each Chief, he always dealt with 
similar thorny issues: too ambitious planning; unsound 
budgeting; poor policy coordination; poor use of military 
staffs by the Chief; unsound procurement and finance 
policies; misuse of basic equipment and supplies; and 
failure to consult advisors sometimes. 2/ But unlike his 
pre-PMAG situation, Captain Hausman was no longer solely 
1/ Interview of Captain James Hausman by Captain Robert K. 
Sawyer, 22 April 1953, Office of the Chief of Military 
History, Box 728. 
2/ Memorandum from General William L. Roberts to Silm Sung 
Mo, South Korean Minister of Defense, Subject: Deficiencies 
in Department of National Defense Operation, 31 January 1950, 
Office of the Chief of Military History, Box 728. 
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responsible for resolving these issues. He pointed out the 
problems and offered possible solutions and advice to General 
Roberts, who then attempted to implement corrections through 
the apparatus of the formal advisory group. 
During his tour as a counterpart to the Chiefs, Captain 
Hausman participated in tragic, yet exciting events. The 
polarization of Korean politics in 1947, escalated political 
violence. The accension of Syngman Rhee, an extreme 
Rightist, to power in the Spring of 1948 caused the Left to 
resort to guerrilla warfare. The Left, composed primarily of 
the South Korean Labor Party (SKLP) led by southerner Pak 
Hon-yong, was supported by increasingly hostile North Korea. 
The guerrilla war started on 3 April 1948 in Cheju -do and 
lasted until a few months before the North invaded the South. 
North Korea, having exhausted all other means to topple the 
South, resorted to the military option on 25 June 1950. 
During the first 8 months of the war, Captain Hausman 
served with the Korean Chief of Staff. However, as the war 
widened and the necessity of conducting operations superseded 
the needs of training the South Korean Army, the close 
counterpart relation between Captain Hausman and the Korean 
Chief of Staff suffered. Especially devastating for Captain 
Hausman was the firing of the prewar Korean Chief of Staff, 
General Chae Byung Duk. Captain Hausman and General Duk had 
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become close friends and worked well together. General Duk's 
death in a July battle near the Pusan perimeter was 
especially tragic to Captain Hausman. 1/ 
Within a week of the invasion, the apparent collapse of the 
South's army in the face of a well equipped and experienced 
North Korean Army, triggered the introduction of American 
ground troops. The small American advisory effort to 
Korea was gone forever. The situation in Korea was now a 
crisis for the U.S. and advisors, funds, equipment and 
higher command support were given in great quantities to 
develop a South Korean Army. 
After June 1950, Captain Hausman lost much of his influence 
over the affairs of the South Korean military. However, he 
had proven himself an extremely capable and valuable 
military advisor. When General Roberts left as commander of 
the military advisors in May 1950, he wrote to his successor 
about Captain Hausman. 
Captain Hausman, an officer of long service in 
KMAG (U.S. Army's Korean Military Advisory Group) 
and Korea, is detailed as liaison with Chief of 
Staff KA (Korean Army)....Captain Hausman's 
1/ Interview of Captain James Hausman by 
Sawyer, 22 April 1953, Office of the Chief 
History, Box 728. 
Interview of Mrs. James H. Hausman by 
March 1988. 
Captain Robert K. 
of Military 
Peter Clemens, 29 
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experience and background make him a very valuable 
staff officer in this respect. He has recent 
Korean history and personalities at his fingertip. 
His judgements and estimates can be relied upon. 1/ 
1/ Orientation Folder Compiled by General William Roberts, 
Chief KMAG for His Successor, May 1950, Office of the Chief 
of Military History, Record Group 319, Box 727. 
CHAPTER V. - CONCLUSION 
Captain James Hausman was instrumental in developing 
the Korean Constabulary between July 1946 and July 1948. 
Without his leadership, the Constabulary and accompanying 
American advisory effort would have floundered. His 
motivation, intelligence and resourcefulness guided the 
Constabulary through the lean years of 1946 to 1948. 
The success Captain Hausman had building a better 
Constabulary enabled the successive American advisory effort 
to be more effective. When in 1948 the U.S. decided 
belatedly to support development of a stronger South Korean 
defense force, a 25,000 man cadre to build this force on was 
already established. Captain Hausman's efforts to develop 
the Constabulary saved PMAG years of work trying to create a 
Korean force from scratch. 
Captain Hausman's greatest accomplishment was reforming the 
command structure between the civilian government and the 
military. The Hausman Plan of May 1948 established a 
civilian -military command structure, modeled much like the 
American defense structure. The new command structure 
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allowed the Constabulary to properly develop its military 
staff functions, which enabled a more effective force to 
emerge. Also impacted by this reform were Korean officers 
who responded to their growing responsibility with 
increased professionalism in military skills and 
administration. 
For history, Captain Hausman has made an important 
contribution. General Roberts recognized early -on that 
Captain Hausman was the institutional memory of the early 
American advisory effort. Just as General Roberts relied on 
Captain Hausman's historical perspective, so have historians 
for he is mentioned in the text and/or footnotes of at least 
fifteen historical works. 
Fellow officers and historians have praised Captain Hausman 
and the other advisors of the 1946 to 1948 period for their 
dedicated efforts to foster the Korean Constabulary. 
As Lt. Colonel Eugene MacDonald summed up, 
The few advisors there had done a very fine 
job against tremendous odds. 1/ 
1/ Letter from Lt. Colonel Eugene MacDonald to Captain 
Robert K. Sawyer, 3 December 1952, Office of the Chief of 
Military History, Record Group 319, Box 726. 
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POSTSCRIPT 
Captain Hausman's association with South Korea 
February 1951. Upon returning to the U.S., he 
Pentagon in the Office of the U.S. Army Chief 
Intelligence until 1954. During this time he 
did not end in 
served at the 
of Staff for 
accompanied 
many Korean general officers on their tours of U.S. Army 
facilities in the United States. In November 1957, he 
retired from the U.S. Army at the rank of Lt. Colonel. 
He returned to South Korea in 1959 as a Special Advisor on 
Korean security matters to the Commander of United Nations 
Armed Forces in Korea. He held this influential post until 
his retirement in 1980. He continues to do consulting work 
with South Korean military forces on a regular basis. 
Presently, Lt. Colonel Hausman (Retired) is residing in 
Austin, Texas with his wife of 47 years, Hazel Hausman. 
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--RECORDS ACCESSIONS -- 
There were three significant problems I faced when conducting 
original records research on this topic: 
(a) Captain Hausman, as far as can be determined, has not 
published anything about his activities, nor has he left any 
personal papers to an archives. His military personnel 
records were destroyed in the St. Louis Military Personnel 
Records Center fire of 1972. 
(b) Few original records of the early American military 
advisory effort to Korea survive. Nearly all the official 
records were destroyed in the North Korean invasion of June 
1950. 
(c) The records held by the National Archives are more 
applicable to the study of policy development than for study 
on an individual. In general, few records groups contain 
documents related to the military advisory effort to Korea 
and almost no records apply directly to Captain Hausman. The 
few records which exist are scattered through the record 
groups of U.S. Army components and the personal papers of 
retired U.S. Army personnel. 
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However, the records of Captain Robert K. Sawyer, U.S. Army, 
are an important source. In 1951, Captain Sawyer was 
assigned to write the official U.S. Army history on the 
military advisory effort to Korea, Military Advisors in 
Korea: KMAG in Peace and War. Unfortunately, he had 
almost no records to work from. Between 1951 and 1954, 
Captain Sawyer dilgently collected the recollections of 
former U.S. Army advisory personnel through interviews and 
letters. Copies of some advisory documents supplement the 
interviews and letters. 
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--INTERVIEWS-- 
Telephone Interview of Mrs. James H. Hausman by Peter Clemens 
29 March 1988. 
Because of previous committments to work temporarily in South 
Korea, Mr. James Hausman was not available to interview 
during the researching and writing of this thesis. 
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In the Fall of 1945, the United States occupation command in 
Korea began forming a Korean army reserve force called the 
Constabulary. The U.S. had two purposes: to relieve 
American troops of the burdensome duty of internal security; 
and begin training a Korean army to eventually assume defense 
responsibilities when Korea became independent. This thesis 
analyzes the impact that Captain James H. Hausman, U.S. Army, 
had on the development of the Korean Constabulary between 
1946 and 1948. 
The thesis begins with a survey of U.S. Army policy toward 
establishing a Korean defense force. Due to diplomatic 
considerations, however, American support for Constabulary 
training and equipping was limited. Between 1945 and 1947, 
the U.S. negotiated with the other occupying power in Korea, 
the U.S.S.R., on how to reunite the peninsula under a 
democratic government. To avoid Russian accusations of 
promoting a separate regime in the American occupied South, 
the U.S. gave minimal support to the Constabulary between 
1945 to mid 1948. 
The assignment of Captain Hausman as an advisor in July 1946 
prevented lethargy from overtaking the advisory effort and 
Constabulary. He was a motivated, intelligent advisor. 
After a stint in the field, Captain Hausman was assigned to 
Constabulary Headquarters. There, he became the driving 
force behind developing the Constabulary despite the severe 
lack of advisors, supplies, funds and support. He dominated 
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the activities of the advisory effort and Constabulary until 
July 1948. 
Development of the Constabulary between 1946 and 1948 is 
assessed through Captain Hausman's actions. Four main areas 
concerning the Constabulary are discussed, recruiting, 
training, budget/logistics and stature. His greatest 
achievement, altering the command structure of the 
developing Korean military in June 1948, is discussed in 
detail. 
Although Captain Hausman continued to serve in Korea after 
August 1948, the establishment of a well funded and staffed 
American military advisory mission that year eclipsed his 
role. No longer was he solely responsible for a tremendous 
portion of the advisory effort. The Constabulary, however, 
had benefited enormously from Captain Hausman's dominating 
influence and leadership during the lean years of 1946 to 
1948. 
